Digital identity in the UK – Will big banks or big techs deliver it?

The opening keynote at this year’s London Identity Week was given by Oliver Dowden, the Minister for Implementation at the Cabinet Office. Mr. Dowden is the Minister in charge of the digital transformation of government. To people like me, digital identity is central to digital transformation of government (and the digital transformation of everything else, for that matter) so I was looking forward to hearing the UK government’s vision for digital identity.  In his keynote, the Minister said that the UK is seen as being at the cutting edge of digital identity and that GOV.UK Verify is at the heart of that success. 

(On 9th October 2016, Mr. Dowden gave written statement HCWS978 to Parliament, announcing that the government was going to stop funding GOV.UK Verify after 18 months with the private sector responsible for funding after that.)

Right now you can’t use a GOV.UK Verify identity provider to log into your bank or any other private sector service provider. But in his speech the Minister said that he looks forward to a time when people can use a single login to “access their state pension and the savings account”. This, in my opinion, is quite distinct from the single identifier that the Parliamentary Select Committee on Science and Technology called for in their report this week. The Right Honourable Norman Lamb MP, Chair of the Committee, observing that “the current digital service offered by the Government has lost momentum” called for the introduction of a single unique identifier for access to public services.

 

I have to say that I sort of agree with the Science and Technology Committee on the efficient delivery of public services as well as what the Minister said about a single login across both public and private services. Obviously you’d want the same login scheme but a different persona (an identifier plus credentials) for pensions, pornography and other purchases, but that’s a another issue and not the focus on this discussion.

Identity Week Minister

Back to the Minister’s point though. Yes, it would be nice to have some sort of ID app on my phone (I happen to sit on the advisory board of Biid, who provide just such an app) and it would be great if my bank and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and Woking Council and LinkedIn would all let me log in with this ID. The interesting question is who will provide such a login given that the government does not seem able to. Put a pin in that and we’ll return to it later. Meanwhile, back to the Minister, who made three substantive points in his speech. He talked about:

  • The creation of a new Digital Identity Unit, which is a collaboration between DCMS and Cabinet Office. The Unit will help foster co-operation between the public and private sector, ensure the adoption of interoperable standards, specification and schemes, and deliver on the outcome of the consultation.

  • A consultation to be issued in the coming weeks on how to deliver the effective organisation of the digital identity market. Through this consultation the government will work with industry, particularly with sectors who have frequent user identity interactions, to ensure interoperable ‘rules of the road’ for identity. To me, this sounds like a call for a trust framework of some kind but the Minister did not use those words.

  • The start of engagement on the commercial framework for consuming digital identities from the private sector for the period from April 2020 to ensure the continued delivery of public services. The Government Digital Service will continue to ensure alignment of commercial models that are adopted by the developing identity market to build a flourishing ecosystem that delivers value for everyone.

The Minister had a tight schedule was therefore unable to stay for my subsequent speech. I suggested that the idea of a general-purpose digital identity might be ambitious and a preferable strategy might be to look at who else could deliver the “digital identities from the private sector” used for the delivery of public services, which means delivering inclusive identity services with appropriate security at population scale. Perhaps DCMS has ensured that the UK taken a lead in this respect since, according to Sky News, “thanks to its ill-conceived porn block, the government has quietly blundered into the creation of a digital passport – then outsourced its development to private firms”. One of these firms runs the world’s largest pornography site, Pornhub, so I imagine they know a thing or two about population-scale identity management.

Identity Week Keynote

Assuming that the GOV.UK Verify identities fail to gain traction in the private sector, then I think there are two obvious private sector coalitions that might step in to do this for the government: the big banks and the big techs.

Big Banks

For a variety of reasons, I hope that the big banks are able to come together to  respond to the comments of Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England, on the necessity for a digital identity in the finance sector to work with the banks to develop some sort of financial services passport. I made some practical suggestions about this earlier in the year and have continued to discuss the concept with potential stakeholders. I think it stacks up, but we’ll have to see how things develop. 

The reason why I’m so keen on this approach is that banks already do the hard work of establishing customer identities for know-your-customer (KYC) purposes but they don’t then do anything with it. So identity is a cost centre, when there is an opportunity for it to be a platform for new products and services. I’m not the only person who thought that the DCMS age verification legislation would be the trigger for a sophisticated federated privacy-enhancing bank-centric ID.

Modifications to open banking could allow bank customers to share data on their identity and their date of birth with third parties in a double-blind way that stops their bank from knowing the site they want to visit, or the site they’re visiting from knowing their identity.

From Don’t let the government’s porn block create a monopoly – 1828.

Well, whether it’s used for age verification or a pensions dashboard, I would have thought that what the European Commission Expert Group on Electronic Identification and Remote KYC Processes calls an “attribute-based LoA-rated KYC framework for the financial sector (ie, a financial services passport) would make a perfect post-Brexit stake-in-the-ground initiative to define the new era by boosting efficiency in the crucial Big Bank sector as well as providing a platform for new products and services for the Big Techs to develop. Talking of which…

Big Techs

I had the good fortune to attend more recent breakfast session with the Minister organised by the Cicero PR people. I have to say that the subject of digital identity came up more than once. There was considerable discussion (under the Chatham House rule) of both the priority of a UK digital identity infrastructure and the means by which it might come into existence. While I voiced my usual opinion that it should be the banks taking the lead, there were other people talking about alternative private sector providers.

It is clear, then, that if the banks can’t get it together then the big techs will  come knocking on the government’s door. I’ll readily admit that when the Minister said “private sector identities” in his speech, the first thought to flash across my brain was “Apple”. The public,  as well has civil servants in other departments who don’t really know or care about digital ID might be saying to themselves, “why can’t we just use ‘sign in with Apple’ to do our taxes?”, and this is a good point. Even if they are not saying it right now, they’ll be saying it soon as they get used to Apple’s mandate that all iOS apps that allow third-party sign-in must support it.

How would you use your Apple ID to log into HMRC? Easy: you log in as you do now after sending off for the password and waiting for it to come in the post and that sort of thing and then once you are connected tell them the Apple ID that you want to use in the future. If you want to be “jackdaniels@me.com” or whatever, it doesn’t matter. It’s just an identifier for the Revenue to recognise you. Then next time you go to log in to the Revenue, you log in as jackdaniels@me.com, something pops up on your iPhone and you put your thumb on it or look at it, and bingo you are logged in to fill out your PAYE without ever having to remember your taxpayer ID or government gateway passport ever again.

 

Incidentally, you could use this to log in at Pornhub too, because Apple have implemented a form of the persistent pseudonymity that I have long advocated as the core of a practical “privacy settlement”. So, as Wired magazine puts it, Apple’s universal login will let you hide your email address from third-party services. Unlike Facebook, Google and other services, Apple will randomly generate an email address on your behalf, and it then forward communications from the services that you sign up to on to your actual Apple ID address. I’m not joking about Apple delivering an infrastructure for the mass market instead of the government, it’s just that I thought that our forward-thinking innovation-centric banks would be the people to build on it. A couple of years ago I asked “Why doesn’t my bank put a token in my Apple Pay that doesn’t disclose my name or any other personal information… Keep my real identity safe in the vault, give me blank card to top shopping with”

The banks have a chance to to do this if the government, the Bank of England and industry bodies get together and work with them on it. But I wouldn’t be at all surprised to go over to the HMRC web site fairly soon to see “log in with Amazon” and “log in with Apple” next a button with some incomprehensible waffle about eIDAS that I, and most other normal consumers I’m sure, will simply ignore.

Brexit, Dr. Who and Digital Identity

You are probably all sick of reading, hearing and dreaming about Brexit by now and I certainly do not propose to comment on whether no deal is better than a bad deal or whether the blockchain can create a virtual hard border for Northern Ireland, but there is one potential implication of Brexit that I do want to flag up here for discussion. Brexit may restart the discussion about ID cards.

To give just one instance of this meme, The Independent looked at a report from the think-tank Policy Exchange and said that “the UK should consider introducing ID cards after Brexit… it argues that Brexit marks a natural point at which to reform the UK’s immigration system”.

(The think tank Global Future went even further, saying that “the introduction of electronic identity cards would address many voters’ concerns about immigration without the need for Brexit.)

The Policy Exchange report was written by David Goodhart and Richard Norrie, and what they actually called for in the report is the creation of (essentially) a population register, giving everyone a unique number to facilitate interaction with the state. They say explicitly that the system “should not require a physical ID card, let alone the obligation to carry one”. In that newspaper article on the report, David goes on to say that they want to reopen the debate about ID management to “reassure people that we know who is in the country, for how long, and what their entitlements are”. It’s my emphasis on that word “entitlements”, and I’ll come back to it in a moment.

I wrote an article about identity cards for David when he was the editor of Prospect magazine, way back in 2005, in which I said that some form of citizen register “is clearly a good idea”. I wrote another article for him back in 2007, in which I said that the (then Labour) government should radically rethink its ID scheme, moving away from the obsession with ID cards and “focus instead on allocating a unique national identity number, backed by biometrics, to each citizen—that is all that needs to be held in a national register”. Nobody listened to me (except David!) and I do not recall ever being consulted on the topic by the government.

Anyway, the point of my writing all those years ago (and I also covered the topic in my book Identity is the New Money in 2014) was to separate the register that is used to determine uniqueness from the scheme that is used to determine entitlements. I think my general point and about moving to entitlements and leaving personally-identifiable information (PII) out of transactions has been not only borne out but reinforced by GDPR and subsequent developments in the world of social media.

Brexit bootstrap

If Brexit means an opportunity to rethink at the national level, but this time involve some expert opinion, I’m all for it. As I have written before at tedious length, we do not need a national identity scheme, we need a national entitlement scheme. And now is the time to starting thinking about what it might look like. So here go. As David touches on with his comment, the real solution is to our 21st-century identity crisis not an Indian-style Aadhar identity number or a Chinese social score, but a general-purpose National Entitlement System (NES). Very few people reading either the Policy Exchange report or this blog will remember the long ago days before the last Labour government’s attempts to introduce a national identity card, but there was a time when there were consultations afoot around a much better idea, which was a national entitlement card. As my colleague Neil McEvoy and I pointed out in Consult Hyperion’s response to that consultation, the “card” is only one mechanism for storing and transporting entitlements and in the modern age there might be better ones, such as mobile phones for example, that can not only present credentials but, crucially, also validate them (a subject I will return to).

Suppose that the vision for national identity (based on the concepts of social graph, mobile authentication, pseudonyms and so on) focused on the entitlements rather than on either the transport mechanism or biographical details? Then, as a user of the scheme, I might have an entitlement to (for example) health care, Wetherspoons or access to the Wall Street Journal online. I might have these entitlements on my phone (so that’s the overwhelming majority of the population taken care of) or stored somewhere safe (eg, in my bank) or out on a blockchain somewhere. Remember, these entitlements would attest to my ability to do something: they would prove that I am entitled to do something (access the NHS, drink in the pub, read about Donald Trump), not who I am. They are about entitlement, not identity as a proxy for entitlement.

It can be done

A decade ago I set out a vision for a 21st-century identity card. I tried to make it a vision that the public and the government and journalists and think tanks and everyone else could understand. It was a vision with genuine innovation and potential that subsequent technological developments have served only to sharpen. I tried to build a narrative founded in mass media because that’s where MPs and their spads get their science and technology education from (they are all arts graduates, so their knowledge of STEM is limited). This led me to suggest that in this matter, as in so many other things, Dr. Who should be the guide.

Just as Motorola famously created the flip phone around the Star Trek communicator, I created a vision of an entitlement service around Dr. Who’s psychic paper. As any devotee of the BBC’s wonderful series knows, the psychic paper shows the “inspector” whatever it is that they need to see. If the border guard is looking for a British passport, the psychic paper looks like a British passport. If the customs officer on Alpha Centuri wants to see a Betelguesian quarantine certificate, the psychic paper looks like a Betelguesian quarantine certificate. It the bouncer is looking for a party invite (as shown in the picture below), the psychic paper looks like a party invite.

200806171440.jpg

Christopher Ecclestone flashes psychic paper.

(I remain completely serious using Dr. Who to frame the narrative. It may seem a little odd to base a major piece of national infrastructure on a children’s TV series, but as it turned out I was not the only person to look in this direction because the BBC fan forum the no-longer-online “Torchwood Think Tank” had the suggestion back in January 2007, noting “dialogue joke about wish fulfillment of Doctor Who’s Psychic I.D. card he flashes in Season 3, and how that’s the future of ID cards…”.)

We all grew up with Dr. Who, and the show engenders warm nostalgia. Now, obviously, there’s an age-related component to this. My favourite monsters were the cybermen and I always wanted to work for Brigadier-General Lethbridge-Stewart, so that gives my age away, but my kids enjoyed the show just as much and I’m sure the current generation are enjoying our new lady doctor just as much. Dr. Who is the perfect mechanism for explaining technology the public and to MPs and Ministers. However, “a national entitlement scheme” sounds a bit 1950s and a “psychic paper scheme” sounds too much like science-fiction, so I’ve decided to re-label it: welcome to the Brexit Bona Fides scheme.

Brexit bona fides

This is how the Brexit Bona Fides scheme works. Unlike Dr. Who’s psychic paper, this post-Brexit version of psychic paper only shows the viewer what he or she wants to see if the holder has the relevant credential. If you are trying to get into a nightclub, you need to prove to the bouncer that you are over 18. The bouncer is looking for a credential that proves you are over 18. You show your psychic paper to the bouncer and all it reveals to the bouncer is whether you are over 18 or not. All the bouncer sees is that you are old enough to drink. Provided you are over 18, of course. If you are not, the psychic paper remains blank, as shown below

nightclub

You cannot forge this credential because it is digitally-signed by the issuer. If a 16-year old copies an 18-year old’s certificate into their psychic paper, it won’t work, because the incoming messages will be encrypted using the 18-year old’s public key, but the 16-year old lacks the corresponding private key (which can’t be copied because it’s never given up by the psychic paper — sorry, iPhone secure element). Since transmitting the photograph and appropriate credentials directly into the brain of the nightclub bouncer isn’t possible, we will of course need to use some kind of clever communication device instead. Luckily, just such a device already exists: the mobile phone.

My mobile phone would be able to check the entitlements that it is allowed to when presented by your phone, so none of us would need special equipment. I show up with my phone and claim that I am entitled to vote: my phone presents a QR code that is read by the polling clerk’s phone which flashes up my picture if I am entitled to vote or a red cross if I am not. I walk up to Wetherspoons and the pub requests an IS_OVER_18 credential. My Apple Watch (or phone or whatever) presents a list of virtual identities that have such a credential digitally-signed by an authority acceptable to Wetherspoons (ie, one that they can sue if I’m under 18) and, assuming that I’ve chosen one that is valid, my picture pops up on the bouncer’s Apple Watch. If I don’t have such a credential, the bouncer sees a skulls and crossbones or something. The customer never sees any of the jiggery-pokery hiding their personally identifiable information (PII). In 99 out of 100 cases, displaying your photograph is the only authentication required: There’s no need for the supermarket to check your fingerprints, for the doctor to demand a PIN or for the pub to take a DNA sample.

Watch Narrative Graphic

This isn’t really magic, or even that complicated. It’s all done using standard contactless communications, standard cryptography, standard protocols, standard chips, cards, phones and photos. Incidentally, after writing many year ago about how we could implement a psychic ID card using the same contactless technology as is used in Oyster cards, I literally fell off my sofa after settling down to watch a long ago Dr. Who Easter special only to see the BBC steal my idea! Yes, Dr. Who got on a London bus using his psychic ID card (see video here), clearly demonstrating that it has an ISO 14443 interface that can fool machinery as well as the psychic interface that can fool people.

Meanwhile, back in the real world… note that when using Brexit Bona Fides, no-one can read your psychic paper — no-one can check your Bona Fides* — unless they are allowed to and when they are allowed to, and all they can see is what they are allowed to see. No more showing the guy in the pub your name, date and place of birth and goodness knows what else just to prove you are 18. Under the hood, it’s all done using keys and certificates, credentials and local authentication: The nightclub bouncer has had to obtain a digital certificate that allows him to interrogate your ID card. His phone sends the certificate to your ID card. The ID card checks it, sees that it is asking for a proof of age. It sends back your photograph, digitally-signed (that’s how his phone knows it’s a real ID card, because it can check this signature). If you’re not old enough to drink, it sends back a digitally-signed red cross (or whatever).

Bona Fides will show the GP your health service number but only if you have the right to NHS healthcare, otherwise it will be blank. Bona Fides will show the employer your national insurance number (but only if you have the right to work in the U.K.). Bona Fides will show the pub absolutely nothing except your photograph (but only if you are old enough to drink). So this is a user-friendly way to implement all of the privacy-enhancing technologies that we would like to see incorporated in a modern national identity card scheme: sector-specific identifiers, pseudonyms, mutual authentication.

 

Now, this may have sounded far-fetched back in 2005, but let me point you to the new Louisiana smart driving licence. As a couple my LinkedIn contacts pointed out, this implements some of the key psychic ID concepts.

  • The smart driving licence app means that a holder can authenticate another person’s Louisiana digital driver’s license.

  • In the bar case study, it allows the customer to select which information she would like to reveal to the bartender—such as that she is over 21. That information is displayed on the phone with a photo and embedded QR code. The bartender scans the code with her app, which tells her that the woman seated on the other side of the bar is indeed over 21. None of the customer’s personal information, such as her name, birth date, or address, is displayed or stored on the bartender’s phone.

Given the the need exists, the vision exists and the implementation is demonstrably feasible, perhaps the trigger of Brexit can give us the digital identity infrastructure that our nation so desperately needs and the lack of which is such a source of friction and inefficiency.

Security and privacy

This is a way to deliver an identity scheme that provides both more security and more privacy. It does not need a big database with everyone’s details and it does not need expensive, custom-built, specialist equipment. In that 2005 piece for Prospect magazine I argued that that the government’s vision for the proposed ID card scheme was tragically out of date and backward-looking. Even the pressure group No2ID were nice about me, saying that that I was someone in favour of an ID scheme who actually knew what I was talking about but “unfortunately his preferred scheme is incompatible with the Government’s plans”. Indeed it was, but that didn’t matter because the scheme was scrapped by the next government anyway.

Writing about this kind of entitlement scheme a few years ago, I thought that a national plan to finally do something useful about identity might obtain “parasitic vitality” (to use one of my favourite ID phrases) from the specific issue of voter ID. Maybe electronic voting could have been a focus to get the gov.verify scheme a flagship project  and get the public and private sector working together to deliver an infrastructure that will be of benefit to all. None of this ever happened and gov.verify has gone, essentially, nowhere. So why am I still going on about this! Well, David Goodhart’s new report and other media comment has set me thinking that Brexit might finally provide the stimulus needed to develop the world’s first 21st century identity scheme. Not digitised identity, but real digital identity. Implemented correctly, it could make the UK a better place to work and play in a relatively short time.

* Bona Fides, for those of you who went to state schools as I did, is a Latin phrase meaning “good faith”. My dictionary definition says that bona fides documentary evidence showing that a person is what they claim to be. Note not who they claim to be, but what they claim to be. It gives the usage “credentials, as in he set about checking Loretta’s bona fides”. I’ll go and register the domain “bonafid.es” right now.